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MACROECONOMIC POlICy
IN A
DYNAIC TWo COUNTRY MOl)FL,1
l3'M.AoKi* ANI)M.(ANiONERt**
tie develop IiIt #1111,10II (F colintri' pa/UI #rinoi,'l 0111/ 1 'tI,r rIte t//,,10/ tItleC ('Il,Uri', p1/let
0ttjoILC at t!aepcl(it vow,'h the it or/ti i'toti.nIU i'tilt tt(lllt'fllp( (a ciIura(ert:e tilt' inter-
i/epeiIt/t'rue of poliev maI it,ta ill 000/icr nfl/i' L
As world riiarkets develop, the study of international CCOnomc linkages
becomes more and more important. \\'e hear Unions claim that their gov-
ernmcnt'S policies are exporting jobs. One Country claims another is ex-
porting inflation or unemployiiient. The Continuing nature of these (us-
putes would seem to indicate a lack ol consensus about how international
transmission mechanisms work. Closely related is the study of decentral-
jied policy making. The gradual demise of the Bretton Woods system has
resulted in attempts to establish a new international regime. Groups of
countries have discussed or attempted various types ol economic integra-
tion. The continuing nature of these discussions suggests that the nature
and degree of interdependence in illiIC[OCCOilOIluIc policy making are not
well understood eittìer.
Vhile these issuesre timely, they are certainly not new many
economists have studied them hefote us. However, we think that in the
past far too much reliance has been placed upon single country models
and small country results. This reliance was surely not by ehoiceit must
be due, at least in part. to the lack of techniques capable of handling
medium-sized. dynamic models. Here we hope to show that state space
techniques, some of which may he unknown to economists. are capable of
handling such models. Ve think that they can be used quite successfully
to provide new ansers to old questiomis in the area of international trade.
In this paper. we develop a dnaiiiic to country policy model, and
we trace the effects of one country S policy actions as the' pass through
the world economy. We also attempt to characterize or measure the inter-
dependence of policy making in this dynamic context. Fhe version of the
model anals',ed here may not provide a very convincing description of
international transmission mechanisms or practical solutions to the prob-
tIJllivC(SIi\ at (,_aI,ioriiia. l.o'
ttUiiit'ritat tItin,o. trht,ci.i.(Iiarripttgi1.
tWe tih tp ihnk seeraI jricrrririi'IlreIrccor heiplut conirneiiis and Liggestirtns.
ô 3!lems of decentrall,c(j policymaking, hut we do hope thatss e have take11
a new step in the right direction
I. A Woino1RAI)iI'v1oI)II
()ur hypothetical worldcOnsists ol two Countries lachprodtjc single good thatcan he consumed, traded or usedas capitJ Andeact supplies two financial assetsmoney anti bondsto world marketsTt) present our new way ofcarr)'inout short-run anal sis ina siniple setting, our model has several simplifvinu fatures.For example,we assunthat the two countries produceidentical outputs and thattheir bondsare per- feet substitutes. This impliesthat the domesticinterest rate. I, mustequal the foreign interest rate,i, plus the expectedrate of the exchangerate change, p. Under the additionalrationaIitassumption that theexpected rate of the domestic inflationr is related to that of the foreigncountrhs p -+ir, this means that the real interestrates of the twocotintries are equal I -r IrS.I lence the Keynesian mx
estruent iUnctiØflS we use in the model imply that thecapital stocks in thetx o Countriesare closely related (since themarginal products of capitalin the twocountrjc are similar bx assumption) Thereare other simplifyingassumptions They will be discussedas the model is formallypresented. The basicdnamics of the model are providedby the txo Keynesianinvestment functionsand expectation formation. Thereare also flow constraintson governmnt policy instruments; theseflow constraintsrequire that deficitsand foreign reserve acquisitions be financedby increases ingovernment debt. Our model difFers fromM undcll's (1968, Chapter18) familiar small countrmodel (with perfectcapital mobility) intwo importantwas. Mundell does notassume all countries producethe same good,so he ob- tains certain terms oftrade effects thatare not present in our model.Also, Mundeil's basicset of equilibriumconditions includesa "foreign ex- change market"equation which statesthat the balance ofpayments (or the government'5acquisitioii of foreignreserves) is equal to tile tradebal- ance plus net capital inflow.Our modelincorporates a stock equilibrium formulation throughoutthe asset sector. Aforeign exchangeequation can he derived fromour equilibrium conditions,but it will dil)Cr fromMun- deli's in thespecification of thedeterminarts ofnet capita! floss sIn this and otherrespects, our model ismore in the traditionof the n1exer "monetar" approachto exchange ratedetermimliltio,t2 Our modelis 51!lt-




Ia liar to Henderson's tWo country ulodel (1974),but WLpV flmre tlttCflljOfl to short-run a nalvsts.
Our analysis is similar to those of Ritnderand Solow (1973),frartson l976) and Turnovsk(1976) in that°P) e\p1ict attentionto the ds na;flic itnpitc:ttions of the how coihtla in tson govcrniueflinstrtjrnents However. our techniques allow LIS to analyze
short-run dynamiceftects in addition to comparing long run statinarstates
The model cait he described h the following
e(]Uat ions
Equilibrium in the good market:
(I) }' = C' + / + ÔÃ + G+ X
('= ('(YT):/= I(q):q=qy/K,,
) i('*+ 1* + *K* + (,* + %*
('*('*(}'*7*):1* =I*(q*):q*= qt( }'*/K* 1* 71*)





= /(p. I, 1.f')
ln the dsset sector, assume that demands aluavs equalsupplies. The deiniaridor domestic money conies from ts(o sources: doniestieresjdents and foreigners Supposethat the foreign demand for domestic money isgivenh'.ti//Po(p I, F*)f1 /i' ' here 4 */p* is the realealtti of the foreign countr\lhn, the domestic deniiiid fordomestic niories is(ti --t/)!/' = a(p, i, } )(I /1'),here 1/1' is domestic re,if seaflhAggre'aling these tso sources. sse s rite the di'niaricj for domesticclones asti/P = ,1,},f*/
a /1') i here o is the sseighted sum 0)ci arid 't c assume that the ieights suchas
(1 (7(4/i' 4-I/J'' (do not change apprcciuhlsin the short-run and tahe them to he
COlista fl ts.
Thus. (7) should have) * as an additional argument. Ilocsescr.its absence can he
ustjtied in the f,illoscing sas. -1 he assetequations art' to he used in desiationiior saria-
tional forms to perform shorirun anahsis. Since thedevialional output rates of the mo
countres arc related it is not necessary to carry hoth variables(i and iiii our notation)
in the assct equationAggregating denia nds for bonds si niI a r Issic ca I use realorl 1 siealth as the argumentinthe asset demand functions.Fetli- R 11)/i'
j(p,i, } (A 1'P si here /4 = qA /':doniestic demand for domesticbonds./]/1'(p. ii
4/P. dorn est 5. dciii and I or fore ion i!iscm ni ciihand5 -1 he foreign Co un Icr parts are sun-
lark delined. Aooregatiiig theiii. ise obtain -I? /1 F PI1I -_R*fl* )/f*
7 ) (.1/ P-I * //') ii here 4 +i.s the licIL'lltL'd itserage of 4-sand 4* *Here thic is additional ustilication toassume ihat4+ since the Faa countries
haic similar financial structuresos assumption Then 4 -s) 1 -s - * * and there
ii ill he little aggregation bias. Esen if this assumption isnot saud, the otheriso reasons
advancedhose indicate that the sariitionah espressions obtainedusing the realsiorld
wealth are app ri si niatelv correct
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4There arc too addjtiori,ifmatrons for the currerticctiiirs of the t(51)COUntries ( equates the rate of citric of thehome pris ate hdiiand the honi1
gosernuient holding of the foreign gosccnintt bondslsniee sse asstrrnc thatprivate hoirik arC riotinterrr,fl!onjll traded) to the curreutu,rccounrt (interest receiptson the tioruic couunit'5 holdingof the fori goverfinlent hond plus net trade balance1 here is a similarCurrent uieco cquatiobr the foreign eountrholding of the (ionicgos eminent bonds
Just as (13) can hespeei.nlu,ed to disctis lullnronreor full hood uianeirrgof thgmmi. Ctnflie!it deficitthe domestic privatesector holding of the foreigngosei-n rnerbonds can vary a sib time dependingon the degree of sterrli,atronadopted hthu ironic gusernm (in add it ion to theinstruniresits sshicjican at1et thcurreimn uuccoinnit itselfIf the iniCrest receipts are negleiedas a small percentage of thehome disposa Heineonithen the cur- rein account equals the tradeh:iliurice aurd ocean slioothat it is allected nubnthe cdrital stocks and G and (t
To examine thedrranrr,es sa full generatitoe rriust introduce toorica insnrunients to denote the dcgre ofnio rietin a ricing of thegus erri iii err t de lien 1a rid the degree of steriliij- tioni In order notto rncre. ihe diriie,isiiiriof the dnurrrnics
can and dii eSarri iResOniC special cases such as thecase of tuiIrrroric%loiuunlcinug of tIregos cmi men ideficits and lull sterili/alion h bothcount rics
frit lu rs curse, the priate hold mug of the Ii)re igri gus er ii nie iiiho rids rem a inCoil sta ft arid does riotappear in the sariuntionuilequation ihe variationalequation of) 13 heconres
+ I '. PtL/
=P((,/
he,rrcRgLR* =(1'% ;. here sueneglect 'ariatiori inthe dorriestuc hioIdirigOf the for- eign moRes Asus e nteri lion ed abuse..tdries rot dependon Raridt bias equal on does not enter the stateequation and does notIncrej= the dintienisron ofthe state sectorIt is anrothcr target equation Sinijlutrisfor the foreigncouritrii rider lii)) irru,ie\ tiranerrig of the dclu1iu and full steruhi/itirin


















I'J( /' - /)4- cOnstant
P/lJ*/J*(p*p*) +Constant
}'½' and K are the real home country output tride btltnce md cipi
IaI stocr. p Is thchomi. currItK\ priu. of Output, q is the price of existing
capital relative to new capital (i.e., OUtpUt)i is the interest rate paid on
home bonds; Gand 1 are the real rates of home government spending and
taxation (net oftransfers); '½! the home money stock: llis the nominal
value of home governmentbonds held by the private sector: W is the real
wealth of the private sector: the exchange rate L is the hoinc currency
price of foreign currency; pisthe expected rate of depreciation or
EIE, and ir is the expected rate of inflation or P/I'. Variables with "s"
superscriPts denote the foreign counterparts of home variables R and R *
will be defined below.
Equation (I) describes home demand for output. I-tome demand con-
sists of consumption demand(which depends upon disposable income),
gross ins'estnientdemand (that is, net investment, 1,plus depreciation,
K)and government demand. The excess of home production over home
demand is the home trade balance. Equation (2) describes foreign demand
for world output. Equations (3) and (4) are the supply curves for world
output: in the present version ofthe model they are price-elastic. Equa-
tions (5) and (6) are equilibrium conditionsin the goods market. The first
requires that world supply of output equal world demand:the second re-
quires that the home price of output equal theforeign price.
Equations (7) through (10) describe the asset sector. There are ac-
tually four assets in the model: home money.foreign money. home bonds
and foreign bonds. These assets earn 0, p.i and i+ p respectively in
terms of home currciicy. or - p.0. i-- pand iin terms of foreign cur-
rency; the interest ratediflrentials are, of course, the same from either
point of view. Since home and foreign bonds areassumed to be perfect
substitutes, their interestrate di1hrcntial will be zero in equilibrium
(equation (9)), and the number of assets iseWectively reduced to three:
home money, foreign money, and world bonds. Thedemands for these as-
sets are aggregated over the citizensof both countries. Using the world
wealth constraint, it can be shown that all three assetmarkets must be in
equilibrium when any two markets are in equilibrium:this is Walias' law
applied to the stock portfolio equilibrium.Equations (7) and (8) are the
equilibrium conditions for the home and foreign moneymarkets: they irn-
ply equilibrium throughout the whole asset sector.Equation (10) gIves
the real world wealth of the private sector. Firms areassumed to hold all
of the capital stock and to issue bonds (or equity) tofinance new invest-ment. The real market value if theexistincapital stockis qAq*A * where q. the price ofexistt,ii cap!tal reltttvc It) flewcapital depend
Fl familiar wa upon the realrate of return OF] huds aridtheflhdftiit1f pro. duetivjts of capttal.(I lere,} /Ais used as apro\\fOr themarai1.i productivity of capitol.) Thek% (F governnients hotidsare
O he perfect suhst;tutes for private bonds,and their real
(I (I //)* )fjtis a component of svealth
In this mode!, s eassume that the homegoverllfl]er)holds ForeiC bonds, Ras a fareiri reserve asset. Itis morecOflventiOfliI to currency as the lrein reserve asset: however,we think thatour il5suttip. tion is more realistic. The fareigngovernment holds homebond5 R,as foreign reserve asset. Sogovernment holdings deplete theSupply of stealth available to the privatesector hthe anloun t(I / P )R + (I //)*)R* the wealth equation (10)reflects this fact.'
Equations (I) throtith (10)determine the staticor it]s1atlt1,letts
C(1f1j libriuni values of}. 1*, 1'. I". 1. f..k. .I. E and 11,FI FlaFllic equa. lions, (II) through (14)and (IS), propell theinstantapeotisequiIjhrii11 through time. Equations(It) and (12)are "Keyn5:t"iflVestt]lcrit func. ttOn5. The constrain Is. (I 3)and (14). requiregovernme,5 to pay fartheir budget deficits and farcignreserve acquisitions byiSsuing11lOflor bonds.* Equation(I 8) states thatexpectahitts are formedadaptively: the
More speciIicitl.q(.tII'A I/U I n* here .t1/'A is Fh
inargui;il product 01 capital. See lohm (t9b9or Sargent ad \ atlace97). Fbi' is thesiniplest nto i/c models inmcorpormfing Kc
nesmami mlilestmfleni ttiimction5 andhas ing ito diret tumkhetneer, inlere,t rates amid the m'irgjrtproductRItof capital
6(jonern merit hands.Lrc flh)dcledas c;ttl loans. liksasim]g5 ;'ceoummtdies pai the going rate of interest shitetheir mlsmminal valueremimaimis Iicd
dcIinitim,nof pimIkregimes imitisi he modiFiedin an ohsiou5 n:m . 'ttifl' rate!egimmie is one in which Rand Rare held constant .aitdo on e can dense the esacte\pre-sI,mnliiithnortd disposablenmCiiiiiC and indicjt the Flat ure oFapprosimatromi sse emnplosInF he prilcess sscan also demiionstr ate lionhe guscrFlmnemnt budget lion
commstraamit equatmomis II 31 and I 141 are ciiiptiied Differentiate (to)
Ii -(1! RI/I' -(tIR
± IiKi1kj(.11 *v /I...*). P *
-).tl*Ik.- Ra,p*j* + (5*I*
SicI'EI'. ne hae R *I"l:Rt; I' and R ; A. i:p' ccart1)1101Cgr,r1i the ttrt and thhiunth tennis respectivelyas.1!+llER*,,14 and (11* 4 - R.) lteptac them h3) ,and1.1) \eiismrmg tIme (i\I' identiir5III am'd7) U). sacobtain J'slitttirmg1/ = 0.
Ii -. /, */*f
..f (q IA(q*1 IA'
-It!lIi- R IT/I' ..1) .t!/ft*I?'). /* _*
II Inc ignore tile055 (File to nitti,iand issunt(q 1 (A,imiil I (A.me'rrr.ilI then I)-- /). - I) is the asonjd
disposable iriCtimite smhjclmis the ailtount hat can he UOrisimflled ma bile leaving
real mm m'rid ma calthiflFact
(m 3(cases ofstatic expectations and perfect foresight correspond to thespecial
a CUSCSwhere 0 and 0 -. (The latter may require a special definition
10- of derivativesand a terminal condition ruling out "spec Ulativehubbies''
nil) or instability;see Sargent (1973), Sirgeiit and Wallace (1973) and Kouri
he (1976).) EquatiOn (17) isa rationality constraint ji expectation forma-
tion. In a perfectforesight model, it would follow directly from (5)While
we do not assumeperfect foresight, this constraint does seem naturalin a
one goodmodel.
dcl A "" denotes a time derivative, while a ":." (lenotes a change at a
given moment in time. Equations (15) arid (16) are the stock constraints
its corresponding to the flow constraints (13) and (14). The home govern-
cal ment chooses time pathsfor G, 7, M, R and R* subject to (13) and (15)
and the foreign government chooses time paths for G1, T*, M*. B, and
R subject to (14) and (16); then the model determines the time paths of the
It- remaining variables.
a-
11. STA1I SPAI RIPRISENTATIONS
IC-
dr We begin by expressing the model in a standardized form called a
or state space representation. This will enable us to make use of several well
he known procedures that have been developed in terms of that form.9 A
state space representation consists of two matrix equations, the state
equation and the target equation:
at.
en (19) :(t)= A z(1)+ B(1) + B2r2(i)
he (20) 1(i)Cz(i) + D1v1 (i) +Di2(t)
The state equation describes the dynamics in the model. The dimension of
the state vector z is. roughly speaking. the dynamic dimension of the
lie model. The instruments being studied comprise the elements of vector
the rest of the instruments and the exogenous variables (including inter-
cept terms) are put in v. The target equation is a reduced form equation
describing the instantaneous equilibrium at a given moment in time. Any
subset of the endogenous variables can make up the elementsof the target
vector I. The state vector z pushes the instantaneousequilibrium and the
target vector through time. In this section. we showhow the world trade
sliP model can be represented in this form.
We have already noted that in this model the real ratesof interest
- must equalize; that is, equations (9) and (17) imply i - ir =- ir. This
is an immediate result of the assumptionsthat the two countries' bonds
are perfect substitutes and that theirproducts are identical. In what fol-
9Aoki (1976) presents a coniprehensive introduction to the state spaceapproach for
econoinsts. A detailed diicussiori sit most of the techniquessse me in this piper niahe
found in Aokis book.
537lows we will make fourmore simplifying assumptions(i) Theoutp supply curves are price inelastic,(ii) Investment is justa function ofthe real ititerest rjte. (iii) There isno depreci0tl,1 (i.e. ()*) (iv)
peCtation:; are static (i.e.ir and lr* ate fixed and equatR)r1IS)S igilored)
These additional assulnpt;onsare not Particularly;LPPCOIiIIgantj in pi'inciple there is noreason thati hey have to he made.The statesp;Lce techniques described hereare capable of handling themodel asdescribed in section I. However,it turns 0 Ut that in mostCOse We Would
require numeric;jl estimates of variousparameters in order toobtain conclusk results. Lacking these numericalestimates, we preferto simplify, themodel to the point where we can obtaininteresting results basedsimplyupon sign restrictions. We leave it to futureresearch to determinehofl)h1151 these results will he. We willhe able to makeSOflle observationsibout adaptive expectation formationand perfect ti)rcsight inthis model. The classical supplyassumptions, when combinedwith the Iictthat the real interest rateslUtist equallie, have twoi ni portan tin1plicitiri. First, the mnstantaneoiisequilibrium dichotom i/esin a classicalmanlier The real interest rateis determined in the marketfor worldoutputhile price levels and the exchangerate are determined infInancial markets Iquation (5) may he usedto eliminate Xin (I) and (2),and then these equations may he solved forX and i- = ç*) Sinceworld output is price-inelastje, andsince the capital stocksare fixed at a givenmoment in time, the real interestrate is the only variableleft to equilihnitthe sorId output market.Prices and theexchange rate aredetermined by the to money marketequations and the law ofone price. Second, theto countnes' capital stocks andOutputs are closely tied.Log_linearizing the capital formationequations (Ii) and (12),we have k= Jo11(1 - ir) and k* j(/*- w*) =-- jr(i - w) where k and are the logs of the domesticand foreign capitalstocks, andjand jare Positive constants1° Thus
(l/jflk*= [(J/j)- (jo/!i)J + (l/j1)k
and integratingse obtain equation(30) below wherec is a constant de- pending upon initialvalues of the homeand foreign capitalstocks.° The classical supplyassumptions then implya log-linear relationshipbetween the two countries'
outputs, equation (22)'belo,
Making use of thesepreliminary remarkswe can express the world model in the lollowizig log-linear form:(Two notationalconventions are observed beloA "" belowa letter denotesa vector of domestic and
°Threaikr will note thatA = A/A' thatis we are acivatlyassuming that the per. iflcrein the capital stock isa function oil or matheoiiti1ifl5enICnesc has c assunithat lot/i='fr. the re'ulis iht tOII()\5 C,ifl hemodified in an ohviosssaif this ZlsSUnlpiionis not ustitied
638foreign variables; for example, ?I PP I.(Ienerallv, small letters(IC-
noteS the logs of the corresponding capual letters. The exceptj(oisto this
rule are i and iwhich represent Jt-ual Interestrdtes dIR! not their logs.





1 -ir =-3' -- n2g + flg* =
x=h0+ h1i- - h2g f
p=e+p*
in - p =in0- in p - in7!±PThI + in
111* - 11*= in+ ,nrp + ,flh.* ±
I = I+ p
w = wo -t- w1 k-4-wk * + w2in + w2n * +w3 hg + IIh
- W4f) - 1c4*p*154 = 117 + W3, W= W +
k* = (J/j1)h
k10 - j(i -
0I;1 + O2bg = o0 + (k4+ og
a?pn* + = a' + cyp+ ct'g
a1In + = 0
(5flj* + h= 0
=
vhere all of the coefficients are positive.
Equations (2)) and (22) are log-linear versions of the supply curves
(3) and (4). Equations (23) and (24) are the log-linear solutions of (I ) and
(2). Equations (25),.., (28) correspond to equations (6), (9). Equa-
tion (29) is a log-linearization of theealth equation (10) where capital
gains and losses have been ignored; w1.,...,w3, w? are the relative
sizes of the various components of wealth. Equations (31).....(37) cor-
respond to equations (11), (13).....(18).and 02 are the relative sizes
of the components in the sum Al + Bg; so, for example, cs/= w/wr
t39
(2) sJ + s1I-1--
(41/B) */(* %f*/fl*
).Taxe'and krdgnre- serves wil he liekiconstant in theexercises tliit R)110W50 7, i'm. Ri R * have beensubsumed in theintercept teims.
We begm by(leriving the targetequations, or thereduced formequa- tions for theinstantaneous equilibrium.l'rices are determined
in financial niarkets using (21).(22), (23), (36). (29)and (30) toeliminatev, L, k and w, wecan solve (26) and (27)for
(34)p = N ( --k + N-pg+- ,\3,n - + iVir) -t-Constant
- P114 1i4 0
0 I-
(The oil-diagonalelements in A'3.N4 and '6are neglectedas Sl1)all coin- pared with therespective diagonalelements.) Thenthe exchangerate is given b' the lawof one price,equation (25).Home and foreignoutput are given by (21) and(22), and thehome trade balanceis given by
= (h1.c-- hf)k - -hflg- constant.
The target equationfollows immediatelyfrom theseequations. Using (21). (22)and (23). thecapital formationequation becomes
k = /n4k¶/1n/1nflg + constant
where
114 = n1 .c1 +P1rS ir /
The stateequation followsimmediately from(40'), (32). (33) and(3).
II!. TntEi-i-tcis ()t1A(Rot(-ooi1(POt IC\ In this section,we analyze thecf1cts ofmonetary and fiscalpoIic in the siniplifled
version of themodel outlinedin the lastsection. The techniqueswe use can bedescribed interms of thestate and targetequa- tions, (19)and (20).
b4()
-F nsr / /j )+ 1flS1 + 1)14t1
\fl2 (n-t U1 S/ //-i-/fl .1;P ii+ 'nrit,
flill, Ii
/ I---1114 II' 0 iv= i:iii
J 0 I- ,ii. w
4114it 0 fin4 flh Hi !v4 -=
--t)i HIr ± P))"lmpact' et1i.ctsare changesintheinstantaneousequifjl)rj urn
brought about by instantancoijy changes in the inStrument 1hv
can becalculated from the target equation- that
..Xl(!)=D!.\r()
None of the dynamic aspects of the model are iii'olved herethe vail-
ibles in the state vector are held coistaii(
We also wish to analyze the On-going dynamic effectsof macro-
economic policy; that is, we want to incorporate thedynamic elements
described by the slate equation. There are severalways of doing this.
The approach we use here is often called a "perturbation" analsis. This
approach is not familiar to most economists, hut it is worthyof their note
since it can be used to analyze dynamic effects iiiunstable (as wellas
stable) models.
In a perturbation analysis we first define referencetime paths for all
of the instruments and all of the exogenous variables. Let?i(I) and t)(1)
be these reference paths; then the state and output equationsdetermine
a reference path 1(i) for the target vector. Now consider an alternate
path(t) for the instruments, and let this alternate path hedehne(j h'
i(t) fort not in J= [7, -i-
z(i) + Xifor tin .1 =(i, r + (T1
where J is a time interval that can be made arbitrarily smallbmaking
small. Corresponding to the new instrument path, there willhe a new path
(i) for the target vector, and we can calculate the deviation
M(t)1(t) - 1(t)
of the new target vector from its old reference path for alli>-.XI(j)
describes both the instantaneous and the dynamic ef1cts ofthe perturba-
tion in the path of the instrument vector.
It turns out that






and the matrix eAt is defIned by
= I + (A + (t2/2)A2 + (t/3)A +
Pontryagin (1962, Chapter II) discusses the derivationof this equation.
641and Aoki (I 976; Appendix A) showshow the C'a'lev-El
anuilton U1eor can he used to calculateein a convenientwas'. The term (eu is a dynamicmultiplier: it multipliesthe perturbationin the
instrument vector to give the perturbationin the targetvectorIrago. TheSecond term is just the impacteffect; it disappearsafter timer -(..1 1. Itisimportant to undertaiidwhat is kand whatis not)assumed t be ''small'' here.No restrictions placed upon thesi'e ot the
perturbation (i' ) or on thelength of time considered(1 -1-).it is the length0!the perturbation in (heinstriinierit vector(i ) that must he "small.''
Impact Ef/eets:
It is notnecessary to derive thetarget equationexplicitly. Inthis simple version ofthe model, theresults arcimmediatelyapparent from equations (38), (39), (21),(22) and (25).
An Open MarketOperation
Suppose the homegovernment buys hacksonic 01 itS bonds:that is,
=o2/)b0
From equation(38). we have




where the secondequality is dueto the fact thata1 =/w. From (25), (39), (21)and (22),we have
Xe = (1 a,4 w4 )niandx = = = 0 Since a:4 andis'4 ace both lessone, we knothat (I- in4 w4) is between zero and one. Sothe home pricelevel (and theexchange rate)rises, and the increaseis more thanproportional tothe increasein themoney supply
The openmarket operationsubstitutesmoney for bonds inprivate portfolios (leavingtotal wealthinitially unchanged).aridit createsan excess supply ofmoney equal to theincrease in themone supply. If ex- pectationsarc static, the resultis quite simple.The interestrate is deter- mined in theworld outputmarLet, so pricesmust move toequilibrate the homemoney market. Thehome priceincrease wouldhe proportionalto the increasein themoney supplywere it not for thewealth effect. Rising prices lowerreal wealthand moneydemand, thusincreasing theexcess
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11,supply of money. The foreign price kvel, the world
output market and the trade balance are not disturbed,°
If expectations ssere adaptive the result Would hemore Complicated
in this case, the rising home price level Would Create the
expcctatiott of
a domesticinflalion and a depreciation of the homeCurreflc' This would
shift demand from home assets toforeign assets,creating anexcess
supply of home nioney and an excess demand for foreign
n1ontThe home price level would rise more and the foreign price level
would acti.i
ally fall in reponse to these expectations efl'ccts.'3
If, however, expectations are very Sensitive tocurrent predictioii er-
rors (i.e.is large), then the whole processcan invert. The openmarket
operation causes an excess supply of home money, hutthe home price
falls, creating a large expected appreciatjoii of the homecurrency This
shifls demand from foreign assets to home assets,eliminating theexcess
supply of home money and Causing an excess supply offoreign money and
a rise in the foreign price level. In this pathological Case, the home
open
market operation would he deflationary at home, inflationaryaboard and
the exchange rate would appreciate.14
Our results are similar in some respects to thoseobtained bMuin-
dell (1968) inhis small country model. Mundellalso concluded that
increasing the money supply would be inflationary:however, hisreason-
ing was different from ours. An increase in themoney supply was thought
to stimulate output and exert downward pressureon the domestic interest
rate (as would be explained bthe familiar lS-LMcurve analysis) Rut if
doniestic and foreign bond-equity are perkctsubstitutes, ans' fall in the
domestic interest rate causes an immediate "capitaloutflow," increasing
thdeniand for foreign exchange and depreciatingthe exchange rate. This
in turn stimulates export demand and leadsultimately to a new equilib-
rium with higher output and a depreciateddomestic currency. The dif-
ferences between his reasoning andours come from the stock-floss' dis-
tinctions mentioned earlier and from hisassumption that home and
2ClearR, this classical result dependsupon the price inelasticity of the output sup-
ph functions.
taThese results rna\ he verified hsuhsiitutijiii L7) into (3X) and recalculating_Xp for
the case of adaptive expectations. If 1is suflicientlsmall, the results described intlik
paragraph mill he obtained.
Lising Samuelson's terminolog',. thereappears to he a''correspondence'' btmecmi
stahmhts conditions and impact eUcts in thismodel. \ e have been able to demonstratein a
sir.gle countrsersion of the model that stability rules omit pathological inipoct efFects
similar to those descr,he', ahose '[hepresent version of the model is. hom eser. unstable for
all salues of d (because ofgrom th in the capital stocks;; this mill he demonstrated helom
'\n obs;ous extcnsmomi of thepresent mork ssoild he to redefine the model in terms of des ia
lions about sumac grom th trend( prcumahltied to the capital stocks;. We speculate that
Samuelson's correspondence ssouldield interesting conclusions in such a mode I. hut this
remains to he seen.
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foreign Outputs arenot identical. (us reasoning depends
IleaviIUpon terms of trade elicts thatare 1101 presen tin our model. -
1n I,ure'a.vein Gor'ernnient .Spein/tni'
Suppose home government spendingIS increased ('roni (38),
/(I - t?lit4)
- ii,.rt)
Then (25). (2 I ), (22) and (39) give
I- in4 u'4 )' -in( I- ,n' ;)' JXg
= = 0and..v =
Increasing homegovernment spending increasesdemand forworld output. The real interest ratemust rise to restoreequiljbrju,1inthis niarket This increases demandfor bonds and decreasesdcmztn(J for both currencies. I3oth price levels riseto restore equilibriuiii intInancjiImar- kets. IF in,m. the rising interest rate lowershome moneydemand more than foreign money demand, inthis case, the homeprice levelrises more than the foreign price leveland the homecurrency depreciates 15 if > in2, home currencyappreciates. Notice that increasingforeign government spending producesanalogous results. Eitherincreases world demand for output, raisesthe real interestrate, and increasesboth price levels. No matter whichgovernment's spending isincreased, the inflation. ary effect will be greater in thecountry with the largerinterest elasticity of demand formoney (unless wealth effectsdominate), and thatcountry's currency will depreciate,Ifexpectations are adaptivethe outcome isagain more comp!icated, anda large / can producepathalogica! results. The analysis isnot complete untilwe explain how thenew govern- ment spending is financed.Money or bondfinancing willnot alter the re- suits above. Therate of growth of eitherform ofgovernment debt does not affect the instantaneousequilibrium(F, however, theness spending is financed by an increasein taxes, the familiarreasoning behind the"bal- anced budget"multiplier leadsus to the conclusion thatthe impact ellects will be moderated,but qualita1ivel). thesame.
In Mundeil's (1968)small countr model,expansionary fiscal policy simply crowdsout the trade balance,and this Seemsto he the convert- tional wisdom aboutfiscal policy inopen economies withperfect capital mohilit' and flexibleexchange rates.However, wesee that this result is
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I5his diussionunirh.0 home andiorepnealrh are rnu'hIcquIer.(:
that isI m4 I A reIatIeIstrong loreILfl se,tttheIji could thenur'i
thresult aroundescentiafl%' due to thepartial equilibriuni aSSUnI plion s associatedith the
iiIl couliti)iiiodel. 'A' hen the real interest is free to an increase
in t)vernUCntspending is indeed trithitioria rv
/.)rnanhie L/IeeLc
In the last section, "disClisSe(I the impact or instantaneous efficts
of an increase in home governmentspending. We noted that debt financ-
ing of the new governmentSpending produced fli.)iiB)iiCt el12cts; how-
ever. it doesproduce effects that accrue over time. Changing the rate of
growth of the money supply or the bond supply vill effect financial mar-
kets over time, and itis an analysis of these dynamic ellects to whichwe
now turn.
Consider the following experinlent: First, we choose relercnce tinie
paths for home government spending and all of the exogenous variables
in the model: then the model determuies reference time paths for the
endogenous variables. Now suppose instead that government spending is
.g above its reference pathin the "short'' time interval J =r, 2+.T]:
outside the interval J. government spending is as before.I Ioill this
perturbation in the time path of g efkct the time paths of v. p and x? We
can answer this question by calculating the ditierences hctCCI1 the new
paths and the reference paths: that is. we can calculate -(1). ..\p( 1) and
x(i)for alit >T.
if deficits are money linanced. the government constraint becomes
Assuming expectations are fixed, we can use (38) to eliminate p. and re-
calling the capital formation eq nation (40). the state equation becomes
-a.1/cl4/
wherei[,n (n .v+ a.c/I/i ) + ni .s+ fl14
J I- ni w.1 ) > 0
C1(I - in4 112 )/( I--in4 w4 )0
I in4w1 ) 0.
Note that the eigenvalues (J a4 and c a4/ai) are both positive: this
equation is unstable, as may have been expected. From equations (38)
and (21 ). we get the target equation
/\f
ac\ (k + constant





± ,nrwr)/U-- > 0
= / (I--w )
It is sulhcientto constder thisthree dimensionaltarget VCstotsince th devtationit) e and .i follov. imriiediatelv
from those inv and p. The matrix e'can he shown to he
/ e14i
ilt )i"'
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Two immediateeffects of an increasein governmentspendingare an increase in the realrate of interestand an increasein the delicit.These two impact etiectsset otl two dvnaniic
processes that producethe dynamic effects justcalculated. Theincrease in the interestrate retardscapital For- niation, and thisimplies smalleroutput and higherprices, bothdomestic and foreign.A smallercapital stockalso impliesa higher realinterest rate, so this effectfeeds hack aridperpetuates itselfover time. The"1ft"
exponentialterms aboveare attributableto this initialinterest rate effect. It is importantto note that these
inflationary effectsare due to supplycon- straints (ratherthan excessivedemand) and thatthe have nothingto do ith how thedefIcit is financed.
Another immediateeffect ofan increase ingovernment spendingis a higher domesticprice level.This, combinedwith the higherreal rate of government spending,implies animmediate increasein the deficit,setting
oIl' thesecond dynamicprocess. The rate ofgrowth of themoney supply increases, andthis increasesdomestic pricesThe higherprices imply
'6gtin. thereader is rclerredto Anki I'176. \ppendi\.\When theguearC
knossn. the,ifiatiR can be calculatedin a rcl.itiiels
siraichifoissardmanner.
'Here c;e haseomitted theimpact term
e51(fltor u tatiunatsiniplictt. This
etleet is otilpresent in theinterval I; it is the
impact ellect discussedearlier.
These price effectsdiffer from theopen marketoperation discussedin the last sCCtOfl
because thereis no int'ettiue




\p(l) = [aj1me't"° +s.s ± a4t2)t1/is, 1e0largerdeficits (even alter g returns to its reference path). so this effect also
leeds bickand perpetuates itselL The second exponential term in
jaitributahto this financng effect.
The third termiii _j(t)is due to a cross feedback effect. from the
state equation wesee that a loer capital stock feeds hack lilto laster
growth in the moneysupply. The lower capital stock producessupplycon-
etraints, higherdomestic prices and thus larger deficits to be financed.
We would expectthe term to he positive, and this musteventuallyhe .so.
From equations(22). (25), and (39), we have
= (S'/Si)(J/ji)_r(i)
= .p(')
x(i ) = !'[ I (Ii//i )(x/si)(I/j1 )] .t(i
The most interesting question appears to he what happens to the ex-
change rate. The first term in .Xp1grows at the same rate as does
,*(t). The second term adds to the growth inp(t). but the third term
may initiallybe negative. Thus the exchange rate couldconceivablyap-
preciate in the short tun. but it will eventually depreciate.
Bond financing of deficits can he anal zed in an analvgcous manner.
In this case the state equation is
/Ii" 0
)\rnv4/a2da4/n
where d1,n4w3/(l -,n4w4)>0 and(/2c2. The eigenvalues are1114
anddia4/a2.so the state equation is again unstable. In this case, the
dynamic effects. Ce' tBXTg, are
..p(t) = [a/ifl2eu14' [(a'.,+o4d2 )d / (2I t'' -
-'72d1(e'4- j1n2e ).i_g




Again, the "/1fl2'' exponential term is due to the higher real rate of interest
and its effect on capital formation. The second term inp(i)isthe
financing effect, and the third term is a cross feedback etTect from the
capital stock to the government flow constraint.
Bond financing of deficits increases the demand for home money
l9lf.> 0, then the first exponential term grotn olDie qiiicklthan the sccondit
i < 0, then the second exponential terni groi% morequick lthan the first, hi either e,i-e.
the third teifli "illsentuallhe positis e.
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-- fl2.ji
g + constant(through the wealth et2ct),thereby causing lO%er homeprices Th prices reduce the defictisthat have to he financedso :hk ekcdies , over time (i'he Second term inj'(1) aPproaches1cmh F
- lat gc.) ThLI 055 iedhack terni inp(i has IWOcomponents 1POi. tive Component diesout over tIme, so the neCatjye component
(CVCfl. tuallv) doni mate, Thus,a bond financed increase in
Coverniiiie,1 t is detiniteIintlatnonar abroad. hut ifseffects on the don'she price feel and the exchangerate appear to he indeterm maUt withoutn unlericalCSii- mates of various parameterswithin the model
A final word ofcaution may he appropriate.i'hroughj thisartil s we have assumed that all of'the e.xogenlotisvariables esceptgoerWfl1 spendinj remainon their reference paths. Itthe forein
)\crnlnlienitre- sponds to the homegovernme,it's change of policy,the aniysisII! h to be modified
I V. lii IN]J1U)f.PFNDI.\('iUI PU! I('V MK
Returning to thegeneral statespace represen1itjni
ec nations (I 9j and (20)e might ask whether thereexists a timepath lOT theinstru. nient Vectorthatill guide thetarget vectorJ alonganarhitrarilse. lecied target pathIf so, the targetvector is said to he"perkcilcon- trollable." It can heshown that thetarget vector ispertctlycontroffaf)Ie it' the rank of thematrix
IDHLBJ
is equal to thedimension of thetarget OutputVector I It turns out thatthe homemonetaryand fiscal policyinstrunlenitsare capable of pertctl'controlling homeoutput the homeprice level, and the exchange rate.2'More speeifjcaIyit can he shownthat givenanIini paths lr theexogenous variables thereexists a Path forthe instrument cctor (,ng' that willguide the targetvector (pt p*along anarhi- trarilselected targetpath. It mighthe noted thatto control both the home price leveland the exchanigrate, the homegovernment 01 list COIl- trol the foreignprice level, and thehome policyiristru, entsare capable of doing justthat.
Whis thesupply curve, (21).not aprice-otltptittrade-oil oth which the homepolicy authoritiesmust he Content' Inthe presentConite\t, polic makirgis noconfined to theinstantaneisequilihriun.the d-
Itl7fo pro dca prool orAoki oid (ifl/OiicrI I97(for ,, more dei,,,!d
SSI 0r,
a (hredrrrieri,n11jstate equationiron,II), md i>. Icu,;, .
0101 -,°21'r and :*at'4 */he ihe state'riahJearid kitnime and /n he the in-
truni1e,t 1.,r,,,hkinI Orm a tarciequionoh '.r mid p(or e,mlime!arr,h!e
[tie rank,n /)i%iI! hc11 to inn, hut Ihrank o('ffl1( Ii, three
(4riaiflic otcapital lormation can also he expkiited. 13v controlline the in-
terestand the capital stock, the home policy authorities can shift both
suppk and demandfor on pit ovcr t I mc
1-low' can two policy instrumentscontrol three endogenous variahles?
Again they cando this because they are able to exploit dynamic elements
within the model. Thefamiliar comparative statics rules about the number
of instrumentsequaling the number ol targets do nol applin thisi.l-
namiC framework
The real signillcanceof this controllability result is perhaps more
subtle than a straightforwardreading would seemto indicate, Itis quite
possible that a set of variablesis "perfectly controllable,'' and at the same
time, the policyauthority has little chance of' actually achieving its goals.
This may be seen bynoting that the tvo country model is perfectly syiri-
metric: the foreign monetaryand fiscalpolicy instruments are also
capable of controlling the output vector [pv p1'.If. for example. the two
governments are pursuingdifferent exchange rate targets. at least one of
them must he frustrated.It might also he recalled that the perfect sub-
stitutability assumptions combine with the classical supply assumptions to
imply a log-linear relationship betweenthe two countries' outputs: if the
governments pursue independent employmentgoals. at least one in tist he
frustrated.
1-low are these observations consistent with the controllabilityre-
sults? Statements about controllability areessentially statements about the
existence of policies with certain desirable outcomes.Undeistanding this
is fundamental, for it is at the heart of whatis implied by controllability
and what is not. To actually calculate the monetarand fiscal policies
that would force the vector [vp e}' along some target path. the home
government must know the time paths of' all of the exogenousvariables
in the model. If. for example. the home government does not knowwhat
the foreign government will do with its monetary and liscal instruments.
then it cannot solve f'or the appropriate nionetar and fiscal policies even
though they are known to exist.
We think that the real implication of these controllability results is
that the world model is too controllable or too intertwined for autocratic
forms of decentraliied policy making. Both countries policY authorities
are likely to he frustrated.
V. Cos'iusio
In this paper we presented a dynamic two country policmodel, and
we used state space techniques to discuss dynamic polics ell'ectsand the
interdependence of policy making. We analyzed a simplifIed version of' the
model since we were only able to place sign restrictions upon parameters
(149in themodel, Aii ohvios extensionoithe presentwork wonIdhcttiappj the same techniques to an econometric model.
1 hree other extensionsIJiZIV also prove it1tereslinrFri theftljj. tionshtphets cen stability andtnt pact efl'ccts may deservemore attention ThiS extensionwas discussed m a tootnote in sectionIII SeCond theper. kct foresightcase deserves sonic attentionin a policcv aluat ionmodel State space represeritatioican he useful in this con text also:see Aoki and Can,oneri (1977). I'itiallv, theconcepts ot "controjlahilitv"and "de- coup!ing' can he used to identifydynamic policy trade-oilsand dvitari1 instrument assignnieritsand to desiin workable
decentralj,eJ Policy regimes: see Aoki and Canzonerj(1976), -
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